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Case No. 20150534-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JACK PHILLIPS, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
V. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, and UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION, 
Respondents/ Appellees. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A) (West Supp. 2015). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Utah law gives the Utah Securities Commission and the Utah Department of 
Commerce the ability to bring either administrative actions or judicial actions against 
those believed to have violated Utah's securities law. Did the respondents err in holding 
VP that the statutory provisions that expressly deal with judicial actions did not supplant the 
separate statutory provisions dealing with administrative actions? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondents 
agree with Jack Phillips that this issue was preserved below. This issue raises a mixed 
question of law and fact, which is more law than fact like and therefore reviewed for 
correctness. Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ~~ 33-34, 308 P.3d 461. 
2. Did the Department of Commerce err in holding that an administrative agency 
action was not bound by a statute of limitations that the legislature made expressly 
applicable only to judicial actions? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as 
Issue 1. 
3. Did the Department of Commerce err in remanding this matter to the Securities 
Commission to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its 
decision even though the Department had already determined that the Commission's 
decision was upheld on review? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as 
Issue 1. 
4. Did the Department of Commerce err in not placing upon the agency the 
burden of proving the value of any offsets claimed by Phillips against the amount of fines 
imposed against Phillips? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as 
Issue 1. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
All determinative statutes are found in Addendum A. Pertinent provisions include: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20 (West 2012) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1 (West 2012) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 3, 2012, Utah's Division of Securities issued an Order to Show Cause 
against Jack Phillips and another for engaging in acts and practices in violation of Utah's 
Uniform Securities Act. R. 486-501. On May 27, 2014, Utah's Securities Commission 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. R. 1095-1109. This 
decision, with one exception, was affirmed on review by the Department of Commerce. 
~ R. 1263-1284. The Department remanded this action to the Commission for a "more 
detailed Order that discusses the Commission's thought process and analysis with respect 
to the Subsection Rl64-3 l-l(l) factors." R. 1282, 127. 
The Commission entered its amended decision on February 4, 2015. R. 
1285-1306. The Final Agency Action was entered on June 5, 2015. R. 1332-42. 
Phillips timely filed his petition for judicial review. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Phillips has never been licensed to sell securities. R. 1096. He was involved in a 
multi-level marketing company called Guardian International Travel (GIT). R. 1096. 
Phillips sold GIT opportunities, being paid a commission for doing so. He was the first 
3 
and primary source of information about GIT to the Persches and Reutlingers. In 
soliciting the Reutlingers' involvement in GIT, Phillips "assured them that they did not 
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return." R. 1096, ~ 8. 
Phillips represented that the Reutlingers' money would be invested in foreign 
currency trading and that their investment would generate a five-fold return within 
eighteen months. R. 1096-97. Phillips did not tell the Reutlingers that: Phillips had 
been convicted of illegal gambling; the risks involved in trading foreign currencies; the 
track record of GIT and its investors; whether the GIT investment opportunity was 
registered as a security or exempt from registration; and, whether Phillips was licensed to 
sell securities or exempt from licensure. R. 1097. 
Phillips also solicited the Persches and Reutlingers participation in a deal 
involving the purchase, importation, and sale of emeralds. R. 1097. Phillips assured the 
Persches and Reutlingers that they would have no responsibility for operating or 
managing the enterprise. Phillips represented to the Persches and Reutlingers that: the 
emeralds were gem-quality; there was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds; their 
investment capital was only needed to establish proof of funds and would not leave the 
country but would be held in an escrow account; that they would make three times the 
investment within ninety days; and that there was no risk because the worst possible 
scenario was the return of their initial investment. R. 1098, ,I 16. 
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The Commission did not find Phillips' testimony that he was simply repeating 
representations made to him by another to be credible. R. 1098. Phillips did not tell the 
Persches and Reutlingers that: Phillips had been convicted of illegal gambling; the 
identity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds; the risk factors involved in the 
investment; the number of investors; the amount of money that needed to be raised; 
suitability factors for the investment and investors; the nature of any competition; whether 
the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt from 
registration; and, whether Phillips was licensed to sell securities or exempt from 
licensure. R. 1098-99, ,I 17. 
The Persches' and Reutlingers' money was not held in escrow. Some of it was 
yb used to purchase emeralds that were not gem-quality. R. 1099. At least some of the 
emeralds were in the custody of the Persches. "There is insufficient information or 
admissible evidence in the record from which to calculate or estimate the commercial 
value of the gems, if any." R. 1099-1100, ii 23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's Uniform Securities Act provides two distinct avenues for its enforcement. 
One is by means of administrative actions. The second is through judicial actions 
brought in the district courts. Phillips asks this Court to conflate these two separate 
proceedings by applying provisions that expressly relate to district court proceedings to 
administrative actions like the current matter. The legislature limited fines imposed by 
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the courts to $10,000.00. No such limit is found in the statutes concerning administrative 
actions. There is a statute of limitations that is expressly limited to court actions, but 
Phillips asks this Court to apply it to this administrative proceeding. 
Phillips also errs in challenging the Department of Commerce's remand of this 
matter to the Commission to provide a more detailed order concerning the rationale for 
the Commission's decision. The Department's action was no different from that of 
reviewing courts in remanding matters for the same reason. Nor did the respondents err 
in requiring Phillips to present evidence of the value of the emeralds that the Persches had 
received if he desired to use their value as an offset. Such an offset is in the nature of an 
affirmative defense on which Phillips had the burden of proof. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO INTERPRET UTAH'S UNIFORM SECURITIES 
ACT CONTRARY TO ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE 
The primary goal of courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent as evidenced by the plain language of the statute. State v. Bums, 
2000 UT 56, ,I25, 4 P.3d 795 ("We need look beyond the plain language only if we find 
some ambiguity. 11). There has been no claim that the statutes in question are ambiguous. 
Phillips asks this Court to interpret Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20 (West 2012) contrary to its 
plain language. Subsection one provides for enforcement of Utah's Uniform Securities 
Act through administrative agency actions. Subsection two provides for the act's 
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enforcement through court proceedings. The provisions of the two subsections are not 
the same. The legislature saw fit to limit the imposition of fines in court actions to 
$10,000.00. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(2)(b)(viii) (West 2012). But section 20(l)(f) 
does not limit the amount of fines that can be imposed in administrative proceedings. 
Phillips asks this Court to amend the statute to place a similar limit on fines in 
subsection 1 even though the legislature did not see fit to do so. "Statutory enactments 
are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that 
interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd." Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). See also Hall v. 
Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, 1115, 24 P.3d 958 ("[W]e accordingly avoid interpretations 
that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative."). "This court presumes 
'that the terms of a statute are used advisedly' by the legislature. 'Therefore, effect 
should be given to each such word, phrase, clause, and sentence where reasonably 
possible."' Sindt v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT 16, ,I 8, 157 P .3d 797 ( citations omitted). 
The legislature did not place a monetary limit on fines that could be assessed in 
administrative proceedings. This intentional act would be rendered irrelevant and 
meaningless if the limitation found in subsection 2 is read into a provision where the 
~ legislature refused to place it. Phillips' reliance on State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, 
231 P.3d 833, is misplaced. The issue presented to this Court in that appeal was whether 
a prior administrative proceeding triggered the double jeopardy clause so as to preclude 
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future criminal prosecution. Id. at ,r 7. This Court was not asked to determine the 
question presented here. 
The same is true of Phillips' argument that a statute of limitations that expressly 
applies only to certain court proceedings should be amended by this Court to apply to 
administrative proceedings as well. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1 (West 2012). Section 
21.1 ( 1) expressly states that "[ n] o indictment or information may be returned or civil 
complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the alleged violation." It is 
significant that the legislature that created two distinct enforcement procedures in a prior 
section of the act saw fit to create a statute of limitations that only applied to one of the 
enforcement methods (judicial) and to any criminal prosecutions under Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-21 (West 2012). 
When the question was presented to the Utah Supreme Court, it held that 
administrative proceedings are not civil actions. Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate of Dep't 
of Bus. Regulations, 790 P .2d 102, 105 (Utah 1990) ("In the absence of specific 
legislative authority, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable to administrative 
disciplinary proceedings."). 
Phillips again asks this Court to amend the legislature's enactments to alter the 
plain language of the statutes. By its explicit language, the statute of limitations does not 
apply to administrative proceedings. The Department of Commerce did not err in 
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refusing to interpret these statutes contrary to the actual plain language that was used by 
the legislature. 
II. THE FINE IMPOSED IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
EXCESSIVE UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
In challenging the amount of the fine imposed, Phillips only looks at one portion 
of the test used by Utah's courts. In Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax Commission, 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division, 2006 UT App 261, 139 P.3d 296, this Court 
identified five factors that should be considered in determining if a fine was excessive. 
li1 This Court looked to "the gravity of the offense, the maximum fine that could be 
imposed, the extent of the unlawful activity, the amount of illegal gain in relation to the 
penalty, and the harm caused." Id. at~ 18. 
Phillips fails to consider all of the factors that should be addressed. Phillips has 
not challenged the factual finding of the monetary harm that his victims suffered. That 
amount was set at $315,000.00. R. 1107. Nor has Phillips challenged the $25,000.00 
investigative costs that the State of Utah was forced to expend. Nor does Phillips 
vj consider the gravity of the offense. Most of Phillips' argument is based on his mistaken 
claim that all administrative fines are limited to the $10,000.00 limit placed on judicial 
actions. Phillips has failed to show that the fine imposed was grossly disproportional to 
the gravity of Phillips' offense. Brent Brown, 2006 UT App 261 at ,r 15. 
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III. THE DEPARTMENT CORRECTLY REMANDED THIS 
MATTER TO THE COMMISSION TO MAKE ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO SUPPORT 
ITS DECISION 
The Department upheld the Commission's decision with lengthy conclusions of 
law. R. 1265-81. This included reviewing the propriety of the amount of the fine 
imposed. R. 1277-81. While holding that the amount of the fine was not contrary to 
law, the Department acknowledged that there were inadequate findings and conclusions 
on this point. R. 1281-82. The Department, knowing the importance of such findings 
for this Court to be able to properly review the administrative decisions, remanded this 
matter to the Commission to prepare adequate findings and conclusions to support its 
decision. This is no different from what this Court has done when there were 
inadequate, or no, factual findings. In LaSal Oil Company v. Department of 
Environmental Quality. 843 P .2d 1045 (Utah App. 1992), this Court was unable to 
perform a proper review of an administrative decision because the findings of fact were 
broad and conclusory. Id. at 1049. The matter was remanded, not for an entire new 
decision, but for "the entry of adequate findings." Id. Indeed, this Court explained that 
if the Executive Director had simply intended to adopt the hearing officer's findings, he 
could simply say so and that would be adequate. Id. at n. 3. 
The Department did not seek to bolster its decision, but to make sure that the 
record contained an adequate explanation for this Court as to what had occurred below. 
No attempt was made to provide post-hoc rationalization or to bolster the record. The 
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Department simply did what this Court has often done, remanded an action to make an 
adequate record so that a proper review is possible. 
IV. THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT HA VE THE BURDEN OF 
PROVING THE VALUE OF ANY OFFSETS CLAIMED BY 
PHILLIPS AGAINST THE FINE IMPOSED 
Phillips does not argue that the respondents failed to present sufficient 
evidence to support the amount of the fine imposed. Instead Phillips argues that 
the respondents had the burden of proof to determine the value of the emeralds that 
Phillips sought to use as an offset against the fine. Brief of Petitioner at 21-24. 
The value of the emeralds, if any, would be an offset against the loss suffered by 
Phillips' victims. As such, Utah law places the burden of proof on alleged offsets 
on Phillips as with other affirmative defenses. 
Utah's courts have held that the party that raises an affirmative defense has 
the burden to prove each of its elements. Vibro Trust Inc. v. Brahmin Fin., 1999 
UT 13, 1 17 n. 8, 974 P.2d 288 ("We note that illegality is an affirmative defense; 
therefore, APS will bear the burden to prove each of its elements"); Messick v. 
PHD Trucking Serv .• Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1980) ("Accord and 
satisfaction is an affirmative defense and requires the party alleging it to meet the 
~ burden of proof as to every necessary element."). 
The Department correctly held that the respondents did not have the burden 
to calculate the potential offset that Phillips claimed. "If [Phillips] believes that 
11 
Lhe investors have been made whole other than through a financial profit, he has 
the burden to prov his position, in luding the value o[ the emeral Is to a 
r asonable certainty.' R. 1107 at 19. 
CONCLUSIO 
For th reasons set forth supra th Department of Commerce s decision should be 
upheld on app al. 
-
_.1_iXI_ day of F b.rua1·y 20 16. Respectfully submitted this 'T 
BRENT A . BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Resp ndents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mai I cl first class postage pr paid two copies of the 
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Maria . Windham 
Beth Ranschau 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street 141h Floor 
alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorne s for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Utah Code 
61-1-20 Enforcement. 
(1) Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to 
engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this 
chapter, in addition to specific powers granted in this chapter: 
(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the commission and 
show cause why an order should not be issued directing the person to cease and desist from 
engaging in the act or practice, or doing an act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the date of the hearing; 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a person named in 
the order; 
(d) the commission shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no sooner than 1 0 business 
days after the order is issued; 
(e) after a hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in an 
act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a fine; 
(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with a licensed broker-
dealer or investment adviser in this state; and 
(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections (1 )(e) through (g). 
(2) 
(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the 
appropriate court of another state to enjoin an act or practice and to enforce compliance with 
this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter. 
(b) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) order restitution; 
(viii) impose a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation of the chapter; and 
(ix) enter any other relief the court considers just. 
(c) The court may not require the division to post a bond in an action brought under this 
Subsection (2). 
(3) An order issued under Subsection (1) shall be accompanied by written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
(4) When determining the severity of a sanction to be imposed under this section, the commission 
or court shall consider whether: 
(a) the person against whom the sanction is to be imposed exercised undue influence; or 
(b) the person against whom the sanction is imposed under this section knows or should know 
that an investor in the investment that is the grounds for the sanction is a vulnerable adult. 
Amended by Chapter 319, 2011 General Session 
Page 1 
Utah Code ~ 
61-1-21.1 Limitation of prosecutions. 
(1) No indictment or information may be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more 
than five years after the alleged violation. 
(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of this chapter, the limitation of prosecutions ~ 
provided in this section supersedes the limitation of actions provided in Section 76-1-302 and 
Title 788, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Paae 1 
ADDENDUM "B" 
KEITH M. WOODWELL (7353) 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
PAUL G. AMANN (6465) 
Assistant Attorney General 
SEAN D. REYES (6979) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 
Telephone (801) 530-6606 
Email: kwoodwell@utah.gov 
BEFORE THE DIV1SION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH 
IN THE MA TIER OF: 
JACK PHILLIPS, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION ON 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Docket No. SD-12-0001 
The State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Securities (Division), and 
Respondent Phillips (Respondent), by and through their respective undersigned counsel hereby 
respectfully submit this Stipulation on Undisputed Facts. For purposes of the above captioned 
administrative proceeding, both the Division and Respondent agree that both parties admit to the 
following facts: 
1. Respondent Jack Phillips (Phillips) is a resident of Oregon. 
2. Phillips has never been licensed to se11 securities. 
3. Phillips, Elliott James, and alleged investors Bill Persch, Gidgette Persch (the 
Persches) and Paul and Sherry Reutlinger (the Reutlingers) were involved in a 
multi-level marketing company known as GIT. 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
000947 
4. Phillips, the Persches and the Reutlingers each purchased and sold the opportunity 
offered by GIT and were paid commissions for selling the opportunity to others in 
accordance with GIT policies. 
5. Phillips was enrolled as a distributor for GIT under Elliott James as his "sponsor". 
6. The Persches and Reutlingers were enrolled as distributors for GIT under Phillips 
as their "sponsor. '1 
7. The Persches and Reutlingers enrolled third parties as distributors for GIT below 
them and were the "sponsors" for the people enrolled directly below them. 
8. Phillips, the Persches and the Reutlingers received periodic payments from GIT 
over the course of several months after their initial enrollments, but all payments 
from GIT stopped sometime in 2007. 
9. The Persches and Reutlingers did not recover the full amowit of the money they 
paid to GIT. 
10. In late 2013 and early 2014, third party GIT principals Swainson Hawke and 
William Hume pled guilty to offenses relating to their operation of the GIT multi-
level marketing company in the case of U.S. v. Swainson Hawke in the Western 
District of Kentucky. Currently the US Attorney's Office is taking Victim Impact 
Statements in advance of sentencing in that case. See 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/kyw/programs/vwa _ Swains on_ hawke. html 
11. Elliott James was a Vice President of GIT. 
12. In or about November 2006~ Elliott James approached Phillips with a deal 
involving the purchase, importation, and sale of emeraJds. 
13. Among other things, James told Phillips that James could arrange for the purchase 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
000948 
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and importation of emeralds and that the emeralds would sell for three times the 
value paid by Phillips within 90 days. 
14. Based upon representations and promises made by Elliott James, on or about 
November 14, 2006 Phillips wired $150:000 to a trust accoW1t controlled by a 
Texas attorney named Paul Emerson. 
15. After November 14, 2006: Phillips sent additional checks to the trust account 
controlled by Emerson: totaling $75,000. 
16. Elliott James also made representations and promises to the Persches and 
Reutlingers about the emerald deal. 
17. On or about January 26, 2007, Bill Persch \\'ired $30,000 to Marrical Music LLC 
in connection with the emerald deal. Marrical Music LLC is owned and 
controlled by James' wife, and James had signatory authority over the Marrical 
account. 
18. On or about February 14, 2007, Bill Persch wired $270,000 to the trust account 
set up by Texas attorney Paul Emerson in connection with the emerald deal. 
19. Ultimately, some of the moneys paid by Phillips: the Persches, and the 
Reutlingers were used by Elliott James and his associates Gail Cato, Elaina 
Lance, and Paul Emerson, for an enterprise whereby Cato purchased emeralds in 
Brazil and shipped them to the U.S. 
20. In late 2006 through early 2007, Cato made at least two trips to Brazil for the 
purpose of purchasing emeralds. During these trips, Cato purchased 31 small 
barrels of raw, uncut emeralds. Cato shipped the emeralds to Atlanta, GA and 
made them available to James or entities controlled by James. 
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21. The remainder of the moneys were taken and used for other purposes by Elliott 
James, his girlfriend Sheila Marrical, Gail Cato, Paul Emerson, and/or Elaina 
Lance. 
22. The barrels of emeralds that were imported were stored in barrels in a warehouse 
leased by or on behalf of Elliott James. 
23. The Persches have not received any return of cash on the emerald deal. 
24. The Reutlingers paid a total of $30~000 in the emerald deal by mailing four 
separate cashier's checks to James as follows: 1) a $7,500 check dated February 
27; 2) a second $7,500 check dated February 27; 3) a $6,000 check dated March 
5, 2007; and 4) a $9,000 check dated March 5, 2007. 
25. The Reutlingers have not received emeralds or any payments on the emerald deal. 
DATED this 27th day of March, 2014. 
SEAN D. REYES 
UT AH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Special Assistant A ttomey General 
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RAY QUfNNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Mark W. Pugsley 
Attorneys for Respondent Jack Phillips 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on trus 27th day of March, 2014! I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Stipulation on Undisputed Facts to the following: 
Maria E. Heckel, Esq. 
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Mark W. Pugsley 
Counsel for Respondent 
Email: mpugsley@rqn.com 
Jennie Jonsson, Administrative Law Judge 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Ann Skaggs, Securities Analyst 
Utah Division of Securities 
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ADDENDUM ''C" 
DlVISION OF SECURITIES 
KEITH WOODWELL, DIRECTOR 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
P.O. BOX 146741 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6711 
Telephone: (80 l) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MA TIER OF: 
JACK PHILLIPS, 
RESPONDENT 
APPEARANCES: 
I 
i j FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
! LAW, AND ORDER 
I 
I 
i CASE NO. SD-12-0001 
i 
I 
Mark Pugsley and Maria Heckel for Respondent. 
Paul Amann and Keith Woodwell for the Division of Securities. 
COMMISSION MEMBERS: 
Erik Anthony Christiansen 
Brent Baker 
Tim Bangerter 
David Russon 
BY THE UTAH SECURITfES COMMISSION: 
On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Securities (Division) brought allegations 
8:gainst Jack Phillips (11Respondent") through a Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show 
Cause. This matter was heard by four members of the Utah Securities Commission 
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("Commission") in a hearing held March 27, 2014 and April 21, 20 I 4. The Commission has 
considered and weighed the admitted evidence according to the applicable standard of proof, that 
being a preponderance of the evidence, and now enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Respondent is a resident of Oregon. 
2. Respondent has never been licensed to sell securities. 
3. Respondent has a criminaJ record. On or about October 29, 2002, Respondent was 
convicted of unlawful gambling in the first degree (case number 00112764, Linn County 
Circuit Court, State of Oregon). 
4. At relevant times, Respondent has been involved in a multi-level marketing company 
called Guardian International Travel ("GIT''). 
5. Elliott James (''James") was Respondent's sponsor and a vice president at GIT. 
6. Respondent sold the GIT opportunity and was paid commissions for doing so. 
Respondent was extremely successfully in marketing GIT and was rewarded for his 
success through bonuses and gifts. 
7. Respondent was the first and primary source of infonnation for Bill and Gidgette Persch 
("the Persches) and for Paul and Sherry Reutlinger ("the Reullingers") regarding GIT. 
8. In soliciting the Persches to participate in GIT, Respondent assured them that they did not 
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return. In addition, Respondent 
made _the following assurances and representations: 
a. The investments would be used for FOREX trading. 1 
1 The Commission takes notice that FOREX trading, also known as lhe foreign exchange market, is a global 
decentralized market for the trading of currencies. 
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b. Any investment would generate a five-fold retW11 within 18 months. 
9. In soliciting the Persches to invest in GIT, Respondent omitted to disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
b. The risks involved in trading foreign currencies. 
c. The track record of GIT and its investors. 
d. Whether the GIT investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt 
from registration. 
e. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell securities or exempt from licensure. 
I 0. In or about July 2006, the Persches tendered $25,000 to GIT through Respondent. 
I I. The Persches' investments were not used for FOREX trading. While the Persches 
received nominal payments for a time, they never made back their initial investments or 
realized any profits. 
12. In or about November 2006, James approached Phillips with a deal involving the 
purchase, importation, and sale of emeralds. 
J 3. Among other things, James told Respondent that James could arrange for the purchase 
and importation of emeralds, which would sell within 90 days for three times the value 
paid by an investor ("the emerald deal"). 
14. On or about November 14, 2006, Respondent invested in the emerald deal. 
15. Shortly thereafter, Respondent began soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to join a 
conference call in which J arnes would invite them to invest in the emerald deal. This 
solicitation took place in Utah. 
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16. [n soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to participate in the conference call, 
Respondent assured them that they would have no responsibility to operate the enterprise 
or manage the investment. In addition, Respondent made the following representations: 
a. The emeralds were gem-quality. 
b. There was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds. 
c. Investment capital was needed solely to establish proof of funds; therefore, money 
tendered by investors would not leave the country, but would be held in an escrow 
account. 
d. An investor would make three times the investment amount within a maximum 
of90 days. 
e. There was no risk. The worst possible scenario would be a return of the initial 
investment. 
At hearing, Respondent urged that James made these representations to him, thus 
inducing him to invest, and that he merely repeated the infonnation to those he solicited. 
The Commission djd not find RespondenCs testimony credible. 
17. In soliciting the Persch es and Reutlingers to invest in the emerald deal 1 Respondent 
omitted to explain or disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
b. The identity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from James. 
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment. 
d. The nwnber of investors. 
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised. 
f. Suitability factors for the investment and investors. 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001098 
-
Page4 
g. The nature of any competition. 
h. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a security or 
exempt from registration; 
1. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell securities or exempt from licensure. 
18. On or about January 26, 20071 Bill Persch invested $30,000 in the emerald deal. 
19. On or about February 14, 2007, Bill Persch invested an additional $270,000 in the 
emerald deal. 
20. Between approximately February 27, 2007 and March 5, 2007, the Reutlingers invested 
$30,000 in the emerald deal. 
21. The money tendered by the Persches and Reutlingers was not held in escrow. Some of it 
was used to purchase emeralds: but they were not gem-quality. Much of it was used by 
James at his discretion. No buyer for the emeralds was in place at any relevant time. The 
investors have not realized any profits from the emerald deal. There was no credible or 
admissible evidence presented that the Persches or Reutlingers would ever realize any 
profits from the emerald deal. 
22. When the Persches and Reutlingers made their February and March 2007 investments, 
around 90 days had passed since Respondent's initial investment in the emerald deal. 
Respondent had not received a retum on his investment. He did not infonn the Persches 
and Reutlingers of this delinquency before or shortly after the Persches and Reutlingers 
invested in the emerald dea1. 
23. The emeralds purchased by James and his associates were shipped to the United States. 
Currently: at least some of the emeralds are in the custody of the Persches. There is 
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insufficient infoJ1T1ation or admissible evidence in the record from which to calculate or 
estimate the commercial value of the gems, if any. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code § 61-1-13(1 )( ee)(i)(K) provides that an investment contract is a security. Utah 
Code§ 61-1-13(1 )(s)(ii)2 sets forth a four-part test for determining whether an agreement 
under which money changes hands constitutes an investment contract. The test is as 
follows: 
a. An offeree furnishes initial value to an offerer. 
b. A portion of the initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise. 
c. The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offerer's promises or 
representations that give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit 
of some kind over and above the initial value will accrue to the offeree as a result 
of the operation of the enterprise. 
d. The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical ~d actual control over 
the managerial decisions of the enterprise. 
2. As to the OIT investment, the Commission concludes that it was an investment contract 
and, therefore, was a security, as follows: 
2 The Commission notes that Utah Code§ 61-1 et seq as in effect on March 16, 2007, did not include a definition of 
the term "inve.<itment contracL" However, the fundamental elements of the test have been in effect at all relevant 
times under the common law. Securities & Exchange Commission,,. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 291 (1946). The 
Utah Legislature adopted the test into sLatute in 2009, with the fourth prong stating that the offeree has no right 10 
"practical or actual" control. The conjunction was changed to "and" in tbe 2011 Legislative Session. That linguistic 
change does not affect the analysis here. 
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a. The Persches furnished initial value as offerees when they bought into GIT. 
Where Respondent solicited the tender of this initial value, he was an offerer in 
the transaction.3 
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persch es was subjected to the risks of 
GIT's use and management. 
c. The Persches were induced to buy into GIT by Respondent's promises and 
representations that they would receive a five-fold return on their inveshnent 
within 18 months. A five-fold retum constitutes a valuable benefit over and above 
the initial value tendered. In addition, while the Persches were allowed to bring 
additional distributers into the GIT marketing system, they were assured that it 
was not necessary for them to do so in order to receive the promised return on 
their investments. Therefore, the return was premised on the operation of GIT as 
an enterprise, not on the work and contribution of the Persches. 
d. The Persches did not have any duty, obligation, or opportunity to participate in or 
control decisions made by GIT, whether as lo trading foreign currencies or 
otherwise. Therefore, they did not have practical or actual control over the 
managerial decisions of GIT. 
3. In concluding that the GIT investment was a security, the Commission has considered 
Respondent's argwnent to the effect that multi-level marketing companies and securities 
are mutually exclusive. The Commission disagrees. A multi-level marketing company is 
a system for advertising, distributing, and se11ing something of value. If the offering that 
is advertised, distributed, and sold satisfies the statutory test for an investment contract, 
3 Utah Code§ 61-1-l3(l)(bb)(ii} defines "offer" or "offer to sell'' as including "an attempt or offer to dispose of, or 
-~olicitation of an offer lo buy, a secumy or ini.eres1 in a security for value" (emphasis added) . 
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Lhen it is a security, at least on the facts before the Commission in this case. It is the 
nature of the offering that is sold-not the manner of sale or the industry at issue---that 
delennines whether a security is at issue. Based on the specific facts at issue, a security 
was involved in the sale of the GIT investment opportunity to the Persches. 
4. The Commission has also considered Respondent's argument that the Persches' GIT 
transactions occurred more than five years prior to the date on which the order to show 
cause was issued in this administrative matter. The Commission has previously ruled that 
no statute of limitations applies.4 Regardless, Respondent argues that the age of the 
transaction should insulate him, in part if not in whole, from any liability regarding it. 
The Commission disagrees. 
5. The Division has discretion to prosecute any case, regardless of its age. While the 
Division might make it a practice on an ad hoc basis to decline prosecution of a violation 
that occurred more than five years prior to the date a complaint is submitted, it is not 
required to adhere to such a practice without exception, and does not. lt is a question of 
agency discretion. 
6. As to the emerald deal, the Commission concludes that it was an investment contract and, 
therefore, was a security, as follows: 
a. The Persches and Reutlingers furnished initial value as offerees when they bought 
into the emerald deal. Where Respondent solicited their participation, in the 
transaction, he was an offerer. 
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persches and ReutJingers was subjected 
to the risks of James's use and management, as well as to the risks of the gem 
market. 
4 See the Commission's March 24, 2014 order denying Respondenl's motion for summary judgment. 
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c. The Persches and Reutlingers were induced to buy into the emerald deal by 
Respondent's promises and representations that they would receive a three-fold 
retwn on their investment within 90 days. A three-fold return constitutes a 
valuable benefit over and above the initial value tendered. In addition, the 
Persches and Reutlingers had neither the obligation nor the opportunity to 
participate in or direct the purchase, transport, and resale of the emeralds in order 
to receive the promised return on their investments. Therefore, the return was 
premised on the operation of the emerald deal as an enterprise) not on the work 
and contribution of the Persches and Reutlingers. 
d. Neither the Persches nor the Reutlingers had any duty, obligation, or opportunity 
to participate in or control decisions made by James and his associates in 
procuring emeralds for resale. Therefore, neither had practical or actual control 
over the managerial decisions regarding the emerald deal. 
7. Utah Code§ 61-1-1(2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of securities to 
directly or indirectly make an untrue statement as to a material fact. 
8. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches' investments 
would be used for FOREX trading and would generate a five-fold return. A reasonable 
person would routinely consider the rate ofretum and the nature of the investment in 
determining whether to invest. Therefore, the information provided by Respondent on 
these issues constitutes material facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts 
were untrue, he violated Section 61-1-1 (2). 
9. As to the emerald deal, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches and Reutlingers would 
receive a three-fold return on their investment, which would remain in an escrow account 
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within the United States as proof of funds in the purchase of gem-quality emeralds. A 
reasonable person would routinely consider the rate of return, the nature of the 
investment, and the proposed use of invested funds in determining whether to invest. 
Therefore, the information provided by Respondent on these issues constitutes material 
facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts were untrue, he engaged in an 
additional violation of Section 61-1-1 (2). 
l 0. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of 
securities to directly or indirectly fail to disclose material information that would be 
necessary in order to make representations made not misleading. 
11. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the 
risks, nature, and track record of the offering when he assured the Persches that their 
money would be safe. Had the Persches known Respondent to be a convicted gambler, 
and had they understood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, they 
would have had reason to doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's 
omissions were material and resulted in investors being misled into believing that their 
money was not at risk. These circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 
61-1- l (2). 
12. As to the emerald transaction, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the 
risks, natu.rei and suitability of the offering when he assured the Persches and Reutlingers 
that their money would be safe. As to the Reutlingers 1 investment and the Persches' final 
investment, Respondent also failed to disclose that a return due to him was delinquent. 
Had the Persches and Reutlingers known Respondent to be a convicted gambler, had they 
understood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, and had they 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001104 
-
Page 10 
understood that promised returns were already delinquent, they would have had reason to 
doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's omissions were material and 
resulted in investors being misled into believing that their money was not at risk. These 
circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 61-1-1 (2). 
l 3. In concluding that Respondent made false statements and material omissions regarding 
the emerald deal, the Commission has considered Respondent's argument that he was not 
the maker of the statements he conveyed to investors. In making this argument, 
Respondent relies on the case of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296 (2011 ). 
14. The Janus Capital decision interprets federal law and establishes a safe haven for a 
person who disseminates false infonnation to investors but does not have "authority over 
the content of the statement and whether and how to commwtlcate it. 11 Id at 2303. The 
Janus Capital safe haven is not applicable in this case, particularly given RespondenCs 
lack of credibility. 
l 5. First: the Janus Capital test regarding who is "the maker" of a statement has not been 
adopted in Utah. Utah Code§ 61-l-1(2) states that it "is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact(.)" There is no 
state court decision to interpret the verb "to make, 11 which interpretation is the focus of 
the Janus Capital case. As such, the applicable law does not djstingwsh the creator of a 
false statement from a person who repeats or passes along misinformation. 
16. Second, even if the Janus Capital test were the law in Utah, Respondent did have 
authority over the content and dissemination of the statements he made. In the Janus 
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the name of, the entity that controlled the offering. There is no parallel circumstance here. 
Respondent did not pass along to investors a description or prospectus written by and 
attributed to James. Instead, he personaJly sought out investors and made verbal 
representations and promises to them. Indeed, Respondent described the emerald deal as 
"his deal_,, He had complete control over the statements he made. He had complete 
discretion regarding to whom he made the statements. More importantly, the Commission 
does not find credible Respondent's argument to the effect that he couldn't have known he 
was sharing untrue and misleading information. At the relevant time, Respondent was a 
top producer for GIT. He had been with the company for some tjme, and he had a 
personal relationship with James. As such, the Commission concludes that Respondent 
was in a position to exercise due diligence, through which he could and should have 
discovered the truth about the low quality of the emeralds; the lack of a ready, willing, 
and able buyer; and other material facts regarding the transaction. In these circumstances, 
the Commission concludes that Respondent is liable for the statements he made to the 
Persches and the Reutlingers. 
17. Utah Code § 61 -1-20 provides that a person who is found to have violated Section 61-1-1 
et seq may be ordered to cease and desist from further violations and may be ordered to 
pay a fine. 
18. In assessing a fine, the Commission is authorized to consider the amount of investor 
losses. In this case, the Commission calculates that the Persches and Reutlingers have lost 
a total of $315,000. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently 1n the possession of 
the Persches have some value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. 
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19. While an offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the 
Commission has the burden to calculate it. The investors did not enter into the emerald 
deal in order to obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a financial profit. If 
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than through a 
financial profit, he has the burden to prove his position, including the value of the 
emeralds to a reasonable certainty. Here, Respondent has speculated to that end, but has 
failed to provide admissible: credible evidence sufficient to establish a basis for offsetting 
the fine requested by the Division. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Utah Securities 
Commission orders Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Utah Code§ 
61-1 et seq. In addition, Respondent is permanently barred from associating with any broker-
dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah for life; from acting as an agent for any issuer or 
solicitor of investor funds in Utah for life; and from being licensed in any capacity in the 
securities industry in Utah for life. Finally, Responde~t is ordered to pay to the Utah Division of 
Securities a civil penalty in the amount of$413,750, as follows: 
• $315,000 in investor losses; 
• $78,750 as a fine for violations of Utah Code § 61- 1-1 et seq as herein found; and 
• $25,000 in investigative costs. 
The total civil penalty is due in full with 15 days of the date of this order. 
This order shall be effective on the latest of the signature dates below. 
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DATEDthis~.Jdayof ~ , 2014. 
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review 
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box 
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thirty (30) days after the date of this 
order. The agency action in this case was a formal proceeding. The laws and rules 
governing agency review of this proceeding are found in Section 63G-4-101 et seq. of the 
Utah Code, and Rule 151-4 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J hereby certify that on the ~ay of _1/11{/lv, ~2014 the undersigned served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS~OFFlcr,cONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
by mailing a copy through first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Jack Phillips 
c/o Mark Pugsley, Maria E. Heckel 
Counsel for Jack Phillips 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and caused a copy to be hand delivered to: 
Paul Amann, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General of Utah 
Fifth Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City: Utah 
Keith Woodwe11~ Utah Division of Securities 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH r;{) N ·r f.?.{Jt,· 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
Jack Phillips, 
PETITIONER 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
and 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Case No. SD-12-0001 
INTRODUCTION 
Jack Phillips ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") fo1lowing a decision 
entered against him by the Utah Securi6es Commission (hereafter "Commission,,) on 
May 23, 2014 .. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63G-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, Rl51-4-901 et seq. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether Petitioner has failed to properly challenge the Commission's 
Findings of Fact. 
2. Whether Petitioner has failed to establish that the Commission improperly 
interpreted or applied the law. 
3. Whether Petitioner failed to establish that the fines assessed were a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
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4. Whether a remand for more detailed findings and conclusions is 
appropriate solely on the Commission's application of Utah Admin. Code Section R164-
31-J(B). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Oregon who has never been licensed to sell 
securities in Utah. 
2. On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Securities ("Division") issued a 
Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause dated December 29, 2011. The 
Order to Show Cause also named James Elliott as a respondent. The Division alleged 
that Petitioner and Elliott sold two investment opportunities to Utah ~itizens (the Persches 
and Reutlingers) in violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act: 1 (1) a multi-level 
marketing opportunity called GIT, and (2) a deal involving the purchase of emeralds. 
3. Elliott did not participate in the proceedings and the Division issued an 
Order of Default against him. 
4. 
Facts. 
5. 
21, 2014. 
6. 
On March 27, 2014, the parties entered into a Stipulation on Undisputed 
A hearing was held before the Commission on March 27, 2014 and April 
On May 23, 2014, the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order ("Order") was entered permanently barring Petitioner from associating 
with any broker-dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah, a.cling as an agent for any 
issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and being licensed in any capacity in the 
securities industry in Utah. The Commission also assessed a civil penalty of$413,750.00 
'Hereafter, "Secwities Act." 
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($3 l 5,000.00 of which was for investor losses; $78,750.00 as a fine for violations of the 
Securities Act; and $25,000.00 for investigative costs). The Com.mission concluded that 
the GIT investment and the emerald deal were investment contracts and therefore 
securities, and that Petitioner violated the Securities Act in providing false material 
information or omitting material information about the securities to investor. 
7. Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review on June 9, 2014. The 
parties have since filed their memoranda . 
. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce 
correspond to those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 630-4-403(4). Utah Ad.min. Code Rl51-4-905. 
2. On agency review, Petitioner asks that the Order be reversed on the 
following grounds: (1) that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in assessing 
the civil penalty against Petitioner, (2) the assessed fine is excessive and violates the 
Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, (3) the Commission wrongly shifted the 
burden of proof to Petitioner to prove investor loss, (4) the statute of limitations 
prevented action taken against Petitioner, (5) it was error to impose a duty of diligence on 
Petitioner to investigate investments offered by others before recommending them to 
potential investors, and (6) Petitioner was not the maker of statements about investment 
opportunities. 
A. The Commission's Findings of Fact Accepted as Conclusive 
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3. The Division asks the Executive Director to strike or disregard the 
Statement of Facts section in Petitioner,s Memorandum in Support of Request for 
Agency Review. The Di vision points out th.at Petitioner's Statement of Facts is largely 
argument and often refers to what findings and conclusions are not found in the 
Commission •s Order. 
4. To successfully chailenge a finding of fact, a party requesting agency review 
must show that the finding is not supported.by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record. Subsection 63G-4-403(4)(g). The burden remains upon the party 
challengfog the facts to marshal aJl of the evidence in support of the decision and to show 
that despite such evidence1 the decision is not supported by substa.ntia1 evidence. Subsection 
R151-4-902(3)(a). "An appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below," Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 
216, ,r 6, 138 P.3d 63. Moreover, a petitioner fails to satisfy his obligation to marshal the 
evidence in persistently arguing his own position without regard for the evidence supporting 
the Division's findings. Heineke v. Dept of Comn:ierce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). The failure to marshal the evidence permits the Executive Director to accept findings 
of fact made by the Commission as conclusive. Subsection Rl51-4 .. 902(3)(c); Campbell v. 
Box Elder County, 962 P .2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. l 998). 
5. Petitioner's Statement of Facts is indeed unusual as noted by the Division; 
it also appears to confuse findings of fact 'With conclusions oflaw. In response to the 
Division's request that the Statement of Facts be strickens Petitioner states that he 
"accepts as true the findings of fact with the exception of paragraph 17," which Petitioner 
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believes he properly marshaled. Reply Memorandum, pp. 2-3. However, Petitioner has 
not met the marshaling requirement with regards to Paragraph 17 of the Commission's 
Findings of Fact, which states: 
1n soliciting the Persches and Reut1ingers to invest in the emerald deal, 
[Petitioner] omitted to explain or disclose the following; 
a. The fact that [Petitioner] had been convicted for illegal gambling, 
b. The identity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from 
James. 
c. What risk factors were attached to the inves1ment. 
d. The number of investors. 
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised. 
f. Suitability factors for the investment and investors. 
g. The nature of any competition. 
h. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a 
security or exempt from registralion~ 
1. Whether [Petitioner) was licensed to sell securities or exempt from 
licensure. 
Thus, Paragraph 17 refers to information that_ Petitioner failed to disclose. Petitioner 
apparently does not dispute that he did not disclose the informatio!l listed in Paragraph 
17. Rather, Petitioner's Statement of Facts attempts to marshal the evidence in support of 
a conclusion that knowledge of Petitioner•s criminal conviction would have been material 
and relevant to n decision to invest, which was not the substance of the finding in 
. ParagraP.h 17 .. . .. · .. ,
.. . . . ' 
6. Because Petitioner failed to meet the marshaling requirement in 
Subsection R15l-4-902(3)(a) in challenging Paragraph 17, and because he states that he 
challenges no other finding of fact in the Order, the Executive Director accepts the 
Commission's Findings ofFactas conclusive. SubsectionR151-4-902(3)(c); Campbell, 
at 808. It is therefore unnecessary to strike Petitioner's Statement of Facts. 
B. Failure to Establish Improper Application or Interpretation of Law 
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7. Petitioner raises various arguments relating to the application and 
interpretation of the Utah Securities Act: that the statute limits fines for violations to 
$10,000.00, that the Division is required to file a civil action to enforce the Commission's 
orders, that the Commjssion does not have statutory authority to make an award of 
restitution, and that part of the action in this case was barred by a five-year statute of 
limitations. 
8. Under the Utah Securities Act, it is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
[M]ake an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circwnstc1!1ces under which they are made, not misleading. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2). Section 61~1-20 authorizes the Division and the 
Commission to take an administrative or civil action for violations of the Securities Act 
as follows: 
Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged> is engaging, 
or is about Lo engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of tltls 
chapter or a rule or order W1der this chapter> in addition to specific powers 
granted in this chapter: 
(1 Xa) The director may issue an order directing the person to appem-
before the commission and show·cause why an order should not be issued 
directing the person to cease and desist from engagjng in the act or 
practice, or doing an act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the 
date of the hearing; 
(c) director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a 
person named in the order; · 
(cl) Lhe commission sbaJJ hold a hearing on the order to show cause no 
sooner than 10 business days after the order is issued; 
(e) after the hearing, the co.mm.ission may issue an order to cease and 
desist from engaging in any act or practice. constituting a viofation of this 
chapter or a ruJe or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a fine; 
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(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with 
a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this state; and 
(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections 
(I )(e) through (g). 
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of 
this state or the appropriate court of another state to enjoin an act or 
practice and to enforce compliance with th.is chapter or a rule or order 
under this chapter. 
(b) Upon a proper showing i.n an action brought under this section, the 
. court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's 
assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order recission; 
(vii) order restitution; 
(viii) impose a fine of not more than-~ I 0,000 for each violation of the 
chapter; and 
(ix) enter any other relief the court considers just. 
(c) the court may not require the division to post a bond in an action 
brought under this subsection (2) 
(3) An order issued under Subsection (I) shall be accompanied by written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(4) When determining the severity of a sanction to be imposed under this 
section, the commission or court shall consider whether: 
(a) the person against whom the sanction is to be imposed exercised undue 
influence; or 
(b) the person against whom the sanction is imposed under this section 
knows or should know that an investor in the investment that is the 
grounds for the sanction is a vulnerable adult. 
Section 61-1-20 (emphasis added), Willful violations of the Securities Act may also 
result in criminal action against the perpetrators, Section 61-1-21. In a criminal matter, 
in addition to ordering the individual to serve time in jail, the court may impose the 
penalties in Subsection 6 l-l-20(2)(b).2 
1 Where the person violating the Securities Act is 11. license applicant or a licensee, the Division may deny 
the application or the Commission may take action against the licensee for violations of the Securities Act 
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9. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed by the Executive 
Director under a correctness standard. ABCO Enters. v. Utah Stale Tax Comm 'n, 2009 
UT 36, f 7, 211 P.3d 382. "In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language. unless 
it is ambiguous." Stare v. Johnson, 224 P.3d 720, ,29, 2009 UT App 382. Where a 
statutory ambiguity exists, securities laws are given broad and liberal construction to give 
effect to the legislative purpose of preventing fraud. Id. (citations omitted). "Only when 
we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy consideration." Salt Lake Coun'ly v. Holliday 
Water Co., 2010 UT 45,131, 2010 UT 45, citing World Peace Movement of Am. v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P .2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). 
10. Petitioner raises various public policy considerations which need not be 
considered, because the plain meaning of the applicable statutes is clear. First, the 
Division's administrative action against Petitioner for the GIT invesbnenl opportunity is 
not barred by a statute of limitations. Petitioner claims that the five-year statute of 
limitations in Subsection 61-1-21. l applies to administrative actions as well as civil and 
criminal actions. Subsection 61-1-21. l provides th.at "(n Jo indictment or information 
may be retumed or civil ·complaint -filed under this chapter- more than five years after the 
alleged violation.'' In her Recommended Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment issu«td on March 24, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") ruled on this 
issue and made a recommendation to the Commission that Subsection 61-1-21.l did not 
limit the Division's administrative actions to five years. The Commission adopted the 
ALJ's recommendation. 
pursuant to Section 61-1-6. Since Petitioner is not a licensee or an applicant for a licen.s&, Section 61-1-6 is 
nol relevant to the analysis in this case. 
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11. The plain language of Subsection 61-1-21.1 imposes a five-year statute of 
limitations on civil and criminal actions. The ALJ and the Commission correctly 
interpreted this provision as inapplicable to administrative actions by the Division. The 
instant matter is not a lawsuit in a court of law or a criminal action. "in the absence of 
specific legislative authority, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable to administrative 
disciplinary proceedings." Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate of Dep 't of Business Regulations, 
790 P .2d 102, 105 (Utah 1990). Had the Utah Legislature intended to establish a statute 
of limitations for administrative actions under the Securities Act, it would have so stated 
its intention in the Act. Bourgeous v. Utah Dep 't of Commerce, 2002 UT App 5, 1f21, 41 
P.3d 461. 
12. Section 61-1-20 sets forth.two options for the Division in taking action 
against an individual who has violated the Securities Act. The Division-may take an 
administrative action against the individual by issuing an order to show cause and 
holding a hearing. Subsection 6l-I-20(1)(a)-(d). After the hearing, the Com.mission 
may issue a cease and desist order, impose a fine, and bar or suspend the person from 
associating with a licensed broker-deaJer or investment adviser in this state. Subsection 
61-1-20(1 )(e) :- (g~. The statute do(;!s not establish a fine limitation or cap as to 
administrative proceedings initiated under Subsection 61-I-20(1 ). In this case, the 
Division initiated an administrative action under Subsection 61-1-20(1) by issuing its 
Order to Show Cause. 
13. Petitioner claims that he should not be liable under the Securities Act, 
because he was not the maker of any statements that were jn violation of Section 61-1-1. 
Under Section 61-1-1 (2), it is unlawful for any person to make an untrue statement of a 
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material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The 
Commission found that Petitioner made representations and failed to notify the 
Reut!ingers and Persches of various pieces of infonnation that a reasonable person would 
find material to a decision to invest.3 Commission Order,~~ 8, 9, l 6, 17. Petitioner 
relies on the Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011 ). However, Janus interpreted federal securities laws, rather than the Utah 
Securities Act at issue in this case. Here, Subsection 61-1-1(2) applies to "any person" 
who makes an untrue statement or makes a material omission and does not distinguish the 
creator of a false statement from a person who repeats or passes along the infolitlation. 
Moreover, as the Commission noted, Petitioner personally sought out investors and made 
verbal representalions and promises to them, including describing the emerald deal as 
"his deal". 
14. The analysis of Subsection 61-1-1 (2) in State v. Johnson, is applicable and 
persuasive. Johnson was an attorney who sat in the room with a man named Schwenke 
who spoke to potentiaJ investors about an investment opportunity. During the meeting, 
Schwenke introduced Johnson as a "high powered lawyer" and a "securit}' expert from 
New York," and neither Schwenke nor the appellant notified the potential investors that 
appellant was the subject of disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State Bar for 
misappropriating client funds .. 224 P.3d 720, ~2. After the district court convicted 
Johnson for securities fraud, Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals. One of his 
3 Goh/er v, Wood, 919 P2.d 561 (Utah 1996), held that Section 61-1-1(2) does not contain a subjective 
reliance element, that it was nol necessary to establish that !he individual investors relied upon tbe 
sta[emenls made, ao long as a reasonable person in similar circull1Sl'ances would have relied upon the 
statements in making the investment. Johnson, et 'if44. Also, evidence of actual reliance is appropriate. Id 
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arguments on appeal was that Subsection 61-1-1 (2) requires that the person who omits a 
material fact also be the person who made the predicate statement. The Court held that 
Schwenke 's statements regarding Johnson's background were designed to create 
confidence in the transaction and gave the potential investors a false sense of security. 
Id., ~43 . The Court further stated, "the jury could have reasonably found that predicate 
statements were made and that Johnson omitted to state a material fact necessary to make 
those statements not misleading." Id According to the Court, Johnson's. view would 
inject language not found in the statute and would allow a person to evade criminal 
liability by remaining silent while others make gross misstatements about the person's 
background, skill s, experience, or other qualities. Jd., at ~42, footnote 16. Under 
the State v. Johnson analysis, the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner was 
responsible for violations of the Securities Act was proper. Because it is concluded that 
the Janus Capital analysis is inapplicable in this case, it is not necessary to address 
Petitioner's argument that the Commission wrongfully imposed upon him a duty of due 
diligence. 
15. Petitioner relies on Subsection 61 -1-20(2), the option of fi ling a civil 
action, in arguing that the Commission's fine authority is Ii mite~ to$ l 0,000.00. Under 
Subsection 61-1 -20(2), the di?trict court has the authority to issue an injm1ction, a 
restraining order or writ of mandamus; the court may also order restitution and impose a 
fine of not more than $ I 0,000 for each violation of the Securities Act. Subsection 6 l-1 -
20(2)(b ). Petitioner would like the fine limitation in this Subsection to be applied to 
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administrative actions,• but interpreting the statute that way would be to ignore the plain 
meaning of the Act, which does not include the same limitation for administrative actions 
under Subsection 61-1-20(1). The Securities Act plainly treats the two types of actions, 
administrative and civil, as separate matters with separate remedies. Moreover, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that administr.!ltive matters are unique statutory proceedings and 
not civil actions. Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate of Dep 't of Business Reguf ations, 790 
P .2d 102, l 05 (Utah 1990). Had the Utah Legislature intended to set limitations on fines 
resulting from administrative actions, it would have so stated in. Subsection 61- l -20(1 ). 
With respect to criminal proceedings for willful violations of Securities Act, for example, 
the Legislature specific1dly provided that the penalties included those provided in 
Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b), with the fine limit of $10,000.00 for each violatio_n, while the 
Commission's authority to impose fines against respondents in a disciplinary action 
contains no limiting language in Subsection 6 l-J-6(1)(a)(iv). 
16. Petitioner relies onStatev. Bushman, 231 P.3d 833, 2010UT App 120, 
arguing that the Utah Court of Appeals held that Subsection 61-1-20(1) limits the fines in 
administrative proceedings to $10,000.00. In that case, an individual who had agreed to a 
consent ordel' with the Division argued that.crhniniu ai;tion taken against him would 
violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. The Court held that the criminal 
action did not violate double jeopardy principles, stating that fines assessed in an 
administrative proceedi:ng were a civil penalty and intended for remedial purposes rather 
than for punishment, which is reserved for criminal actions. Bushman, ~~ l 0-20. The 
4 Interestingly, Petitioner wantq to treat Subsections 61-1-20(1) nnd (2) the same when it comes to a limit of 
$10,000.00 for ea.ch violation of the Securities Act, but then argues that they are different as to restitution -
he cannot have it both ways. 
12 
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Cout1 also held that the Security Act's fine authority was not excessive in relation to its 
beneficial and remedial purpose. Id, ~121. fn a subsequent footnote, the Court stated: 
We note that the fines that the Division could impose and judicially 
enforce were limited to $500 for each violation of the Act at the time of 
the entry of the Consent Order, see Utah Code Ann. §61-l-20(2)(b)(vii) 
(2006), and are now limited to $10,000 per violation, see id §61-J-
20(2)(b)(viii) (Supp. 2009). We express no opinion as to whether a fine 
that is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the underlying securities 
violation might give rise to some sort of as-applied double jeopardy • 
challenge in the appropriate case: this case, however, does not present 
such circwnstances. · 
Id., footnote 4. Petitioner relies on this footnote 4. It is important to note, however, that 
in Bushman, the Court considered the double jeopardy clause i.ssue and the differences 
between criminal o.nd administrative actions; the Court did not squarely address the 
differences between adniinistrative and civil actions. Thus, the Court's footnote did not 
focus on the fine limits iµ an administrative action as opposed to fine limits in a civil 
action. If that was squarely at issue, the Court would certainly have noted the plain 
language of Sections 61-1-20(1) and (2), with a limit of $10,000.00 provided only .jn civil 
actions.) Finaliy, even iif it were aeld :that {he Commission's au,thority to issue fim,-s f.or 
v.io:lations of the Sec1:1r.ities Act is l1mi,te0 ,to$ H.iJ,000:~0 per v1-olati•cm, the Commission's 
Order with its fine of$78,750.00 for four violations of the Act would rocctsuch a limit. 
See Commission Order, p. 13. ;retitioner clearly challenges the $315,000.00 fine 
assessed for investor losses, which is addressed fully below. / 
17 . Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, the Securities Act does not require the 
Division to first obtain an administrative order from the Com.mission under Subsection 
61 -1-20( 1) and then file a civil action under Subsection 61-1-20(2) to enforce the 
Commission's order. The plain language in Section 61-1-20 does not make the 
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administrative action dependent on a follow up civil action. This is clear from the use of 
''may" rather than "shalP' in both Subsection 61-1-20(1) and (2). 11 According to its 
ordinary construction, the tenn 1may1 means permissive, and it should receive that 
interpretation unless such a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of 
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or absurdity." MC. v. KH.C. 
(state Ex Rel MC.), 940 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citations omitted. The 
term "shall/ is usually presumed mandatory. Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). See also Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 
(Utah 1974) ("The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command.'')-
18. As the Division has pointed out, if we interpreted Section 61-1-20 to 
require the Division to file a civil action each time an order in an administrative action 
was issued, there would be no reason to file any administrative actions before the 
Commission and Subsection 61-1-20( 1) would b~ superfluous. It is our duty to avoid 
interpreting a statute in a manner that renders portions of the statute meaningless. Brent 
Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div., 139 P .3d 296, 
iJl 1, 2006 lIT App 261; Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616,119, 2000 UT 19. Any reliance on 
Subsection 63G-4-50l(l)(a) is misplaced. That Subsectjon provides, ''[i]n addition to 
other remedies provided in law, an agency may seek enforcement of any order by seeking 
civil enforcement in the district court. 11 That Subsectioo also uses a pem1issive "may," 
and does not make it mandatory for an agency to immediately file a civil action to 
enforce its orders. Rather, Subsection 630-4-501(1) provides the agency a remedy when 
a violator fails to comply with an administrative order of the agency. 
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19. Petitioner next claims that the Commission violated its statutory authority 
in assessing a $315,000.00 fine for investor losses, stating that the fine in fact constitutes 
restitution) which the Commission does not have the authority to assess under Subsection 
61-1-20(1 ). However, the Legislature gave the Commission the authority in Section 61-
1 ~20(1)(f) to impose a fine, and as stated previously, there is no limit set by the 
Legislature for such fines in an administrative action. The Legislature also gave the 
Division the authority, with the concurrence of the Commission, to adopt rules to carry 
out the provisions of the Securities Act. Section 61-1-24(l)(a). 
20. Pursuant to a rule adopted by the Division, the Commission may consider 
various factors in detennining the amount of fines against violators of the Securities 
Act. Utah Admin. Code Section Rl 64-31-1, "Guidelines for Assessment of 
Administrative Fines," provides: 
(1) For the purpose of detennining the amount of an administrative ·fine 
assessed again~ a person under the Utah Unifonn Securities Act, the 
Commission shall consider the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the 
conduct constituting the violation; 
(b) the harm to other persons. including the qmount of investor losses, 
resulting either directly or indirectly from the violation; 
(c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration 
received directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation; 
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division 
concerning the violation1 efforts to prevent future occWTences of the violation, 
and efforts to mitigate the harm caused by the violation, incJuding any 
restitutio.n paid or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the 
acts of the person; 
(e) the history of previous violations by the person; 
(f) the need to deter the persoi:i or other persons from committing such 
violations in the future; 
(g) the costs of the Division in investigating and prosecuting the action; and 
(h) such other matters as justice may require. 
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Rl64-31-l(B)(emphasisadded). Therefore. the$315,000.00 finewasnotfor 
restitution, but was assessed pursuant to authority granted to the Commission as 
part of its administrative action against someone who violated the ~ecurities Act. 
Petitioner's reliance on a newspaper article supposedly quoting the Division 
Director is misplaced. The Di vision Director1s reference in that article was to a 
whistle blower provision in the Securities Act, which allows the Commission to 
make an award from the Securities Investigadons, Education, Licensing, and 
Enforcement Fund to a person who reports a violation of the Act. Section 61-1-
106. 
21. Petitioner argues that the Division fa.iled to carry out its burden of proof 
as to losses suffered by the Persches, claiming that the Division has a duty to establish the 
value ofthe stones now in possession of the Persches for a potential offset or reduction in 
Petitioner's fine. Pursuant to Utah Ad.min. Code Rl 51-4-709(1), the Division has the 
burden of proof to establish a violation of the Securities Act pursuant to its Order to 
Show Cause. The Division met that burden. Nothing in the applicable laws or rules 
requires the Division to prove any offset to the fines properly assessed by the 
Commission-pursuant to statute. The Division and the Commission are ~ot assessing 
actual damages like in a civH case and need not engage in the analysis of actual value of 
the stones. Given that the Division met the burden of proof to establish Petitioner's 
violations of the Securities Act, it was oat unreasonable for the Commission to require 
Petitioner to establish the value of the stones. Had Petitioner presented evidence of the 
actual va)ue of the stones, the Commission would have offset the fines assessed. The 
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Commission Order stated that while a potential offset could be appropriate> Petitioner 
has the burden to establish ilie value of those stones. Commission Order, at 13. 
22. The total civil penalty of $413,750.00 does not violate the Eighth 
Arnendm~nt, which states "[e]xcessive bail shall not be requ!red, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor crue] and unusual punishment inflicted. U.S. Constitution, Amendment 
VIII. Petitioner relies on the case of United States v. Bajakajian. 524 U.S. 321 ( 1998). 
Mr. Bajakajian attempied to transfer $357,144.00 in casn out of the country and he failed 
to disclose those .funds in violation of law. Bajakajian, at 334. The question was 
whether it violated the Eighth Amendment to require him to forfeit the entire amount. 
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that forfeiture of the entire amount would violate the 
Eighth Amendment, stating the principles that the amount of the forfeiture must bear 
some relationship to the gravity of the offense and judgments about the appropriate 
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance with the legislature. ld,at 334, 
336. 
23. The Utah Supreme Court used that Bajakajian analysis in Brent Brown 
Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div. The Court he]d that a fine 
, violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is "grossly disproportionaJ to the gravity of a . 
defendant, s offense. n Brown, 13 9 P .3d 296, at~ 16. The Court also stressed that the fine 
assessed should be compared to _the maximum that could have been levied, and that the 
extent of the unlawful activity and amount of illegal- gain should be considered in relation 
to the penalty and the harm caused. The Court upheld the fine of $135,000.00 assessed 
by the Utah Division of Vehicle Enforcement against Brent Brown Dealerships for 
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selling vehicles through unlicensed sales people as not grossly disproportional to the 
repeated licensing violations over a period of time. Id., at 120. 
24. Now app1ying the analysis in Brown and Bajakajian, the Executive 
Director concludes that the $413,750.00 fine assessed againsl Petitioner is not grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of Petitioner's conduct and violation oflaw. The Utah 
Legislature gave the Commission the authority to talce administrative actj.on againsl those 
who violate the Securities Act and to assess fines for such violations. The Legislature did 
not establish a. maximum fine that the Commission may impose. Petitioner's conduct in 
presenting the investment opportunities to the Persches and the Reutlingers in violation of 
Subsection 61-1-1 (2) was deserving of the $413,750.00 fine in light of the four violations 
of the Securities Act involving multiple investors, the investigation costs incurred by the 
Division, and the victims' loss of more Lhan $315,000.00 in amounts invested. As the 
/ 
Division has pointed out, Bajakajian and Brown are distinguishable. There were no 
victims with losses of $3 l 5J000.00 in those cases. In Brown, those who purchased cars 
from unlicensed dealers receiyed the value of their investment when they received their 
vehicles, while in Bajakajian, there were no victims. In addition, there was only one 
violation of l-aw in Bajakajian. 
25. Petitioner has also failed to establish that the civil penalty of $413,750.00 
was clearly unreasonable. In Johnson-Bowles v. Division o/Sec., 829 P.2d 101, 114 
(Utah App.), ce1t. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals 
examined Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6( 1) and found that the Legislature granted the agency 
express or, at the least, implicit discretion to penalize the licenses of s.ecurities brokers for 
violations of the Securities Act. Due to the broad discretionary powers of the agency to 
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impose sanctions, the Court held that it would 11 not disturb the agencis decision unless it 
is clearly unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of that discretion." Johnson-Bowles, 829 
P.2d at l 16, citing Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)(l989), predecessor to 
Subsection 6JG-4-403(4)(h)(i), Accordingly, the Executive Director will not disturb the 
civil penalty assessed by the Commission, because as discussed in paragraph 22 above, 
Petitioner has failed to establish that the fine is clearly unreasonable. Johnson-Bowle:s, 
829 P.2d at I 16. 
26. Petitioner claims that lhe Commission failed to consider the factors 
in Utah Adm in. Code Subsection R 164-31-1 (I). Subsection Rl 64-31 ~ 1 ( l) sets forth 
numerous factors that the Commission "shaU 11 consider in "determining the amount of an 
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Unifonn Securitie~ Act. 11 A 
review of the Com.mission Order indicates that the Commission acknowledges. its 
authority to consider investor losses, which is authority given in Subsection Rl 64-31-
1 ( 1 )(b ), but the Order does not reference the rule, nor does the Order address or discuss 
the other factors in Subsection Rl64-31-l(l). An agency's findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was raised. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n, 821 P.2d IJ 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-Davis, 
Inc. v. Davis County Comm 'n, 2005 UT App. 347, ~ 17J J 21 P.Jd 39. Where.a Division 
order fails to reveal a logical analysis of the applicable law and the facts, the appropriate 
remedy is a remand to the Division for further proceedings. LaSal Oil Co. v. Department 
ofEnvtl. Qua/,ty, 843 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Adams, atp. 8. 
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27. Because the Commission Order does not include a discussion and analysis 
of the factors in Subsection Rl 64-31-1 (1) that it found relevant in assessing the total fine 
against Petitioner, this matter is remanded to the Commi~sion solely for a more detailed 
Order that discusses the Commission ,s thought process and anaJysis with respect to the 
Subsection R1Q4-31-1(1) factors. 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
The Commission's Order is affum.ed as foJlows. The Findings of Fact are 
adopted as conclusive. Petitioner has failed to establish that the Commission's 
interpretatfon or application of law was in error. The fines assessed against Petitioner do 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. However, a remand is appropriate for the 1imited 
purpose of obtaining a more detailed Order that discusses the Commission's thought 
process and analysis with respect to the Subsection R164-31-l(l) factors. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition 
for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 630-4-401 and 630-4~403, 
Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeous v. 
Department of Commerce, et al., 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
date of this Order pursuant to Section 630-4-302. 
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Francine A. Giani, Exec tin ofil!!f;-
Utah Department of Commerce 
21 
CERTIFICATE OFMAil,lNG 
I certify that on the qth day of January, 2015 1 the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lawj and Order on 
Review by first class and certified mail to: 
MARK W PUGSLEY ESQ 
MARlA E HECKEL 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER PC 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 14TH FL 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0385 
and caused a copy to be electronically mailed to: 
Keith Woodwell, Director (kwoodwell@utah.gov) 
Division of Securities 
160 East JOO South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tom Melton, Assistant Attorney General (tme1ton@utah.gov) 
Office of the Attorney General 
Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001284 
-
22 
ADDENDUM ''E'' 
DIVJSION OF SECURITIES 
KEITH WOODWELL, OlR.ECTOR 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
P.O. BOX 146741 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-671 l 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
______ ._ ..... 4 ________________ _
IN THE MATTER OF: 
JACK PHILLIPS, 
RESPONDENT 
BEFORE THE DfVIS!ON OF SECURITlES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CO1vllv1ERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
j AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
I 
/ CASE NO. SD-12-0001 
I 
BY 'fHE UT AH SECURITIES COM1\.1JSSION: 
Pursuant to the January 9, 20 l5 Order issued on agency review by the Department of 
Commerce in this matter, the Utah Securities Commission supplements and amends, as follows, 
Paragraphs 18 and 19 in the Conclusions of Law section set forth in the May 23, 2014 Order 
issued in this matter following hearing. 
18. In assessing a fine, the Commission is charged under Utah Administrative Code§ Rl64-
3 l-l (b )( 1) to consider the following factors: 
a. the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct 
constituting the violation; 
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b. the hann to other persons, including the amount of investor losses, resulting either 
directly or indirectly from the violation; 
c. any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration received 
directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation~ 
d. cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division concerning 
the violation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of the violation, and efforts to 
mitigate the ha.rm caused by the violation, including any restitution paid or 
disgorgernent of ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the acts of the person; 
c. the history of previous violations by the person~ 
f the need to deter the person or other persons from committing such v1olations in 
the future; 
g. the costs incurred by the Division in investigating and prosecuting the action; and 
h. such other matters as justice may require. 
In this case, Respondent developed very personal, trusting relationships with the Persches 
and Reutlingers over time. On the bnsis of these relationships of trust and confidence, and 
through repeated and persistent solicitation, Respondent convinced the Persches and 
Reutlingers that he was favoring them with an exclusive opportunity not otherwise 
available. This predatory behavior in ta.1cing advantage of persons with whom he had a 
close, personal relationship constitutes affinity fraud by Respondent, which is a 
particularly serious and repellent form of deceit and must be severely sanctioned in order 
for the sanction to act as a deterrent. In addition, Respondent has not cooperated with the 
Division, either to locate James or in any other manner. In these circumstances, the total 
investor 1osses of $315,000 directly caused by Respondent's actions are appropriately 
included in the total fine amount, as are the Division's claimed investigative costs of 
$25,000. 
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In accordance with precedent, the Commission also finds it appropriate to assess, as a 
penalty for violations of the chapter, a fine calculated at 25% of the total investor losses. 4. 
19. Respondent argues that the emeralds cWTently in the possession of the Persches have 
some unspecified value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. While an 
offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the Commission has the 
burden to investigate and calculate a potential offset, if any. The investors did not enter 
into the emerald deal in order to obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a 
financial profit from an investment. If Respondent believes that the investors have been 
made whole other than through a financial return, Respondent has the burden to prove his 
position, including the value of the emeralds to a reasonable certainty, with competent 
and admissible evidence. Here, Respondent has speculated to that end, but has failed to 
provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish any factual basis for 
offsetting the fine requested by the Division. Respondent merely speculates about 
potential value, but does not prove the value, if any, of the alleged emeralds. 
This amended order shall be effective on the latest of the signature dates below. 
4• There is no evidence in the record that Respondent received any me1111ingful financial benefit, enri<:hmeot, 
commiS.'lion, fee or other consideration from tbe transactioru involving the Persches and the Reutlingers. Nor is 
there evidence that Respondent has a history of previous violations. lfsuch evidence were available, the 
circwnstances might constitute additional aggravating factors justifying 9JI additional pe-nalty. Without sucb 
evidence, the Commi.uion finds it appropriate to assess Respondeot's fine according to established precedent fore 
first offense where the respoi:ideut received little to no financial benefit from the transactions at issue. 
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day of _1'----~ _6 ___ Yv_C\_r,..,,,___, 201 S. 
UT AH SECURJTIBS COMMISSION 
Pa.ge4 
-
vJ 
DATEDthls .-¢1: 
DATED this 
dayof~2015. 
:gned by the Presiding Officer pursuant to a grant 
of authority from Commissioner Tim Bangerter and 
on Mr. Bangerter's behalf. 
Signed by the Presiding Officer pursuant to a grant 
of authority from Commissioner Brent Baker and on 
Mr. Baker's behalf. 
DATED this_£_ day of=-1.,~ .• 2015. 
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of authority from Commissioner David Russon and 
on Mr. Russoo's behalf. 
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a reque.st for agency review 
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box 
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thirty (30) days after the date of this 
order. The agency action in this case was a formal proceeding. The laws and rules 
governing agency review of this proceeding are found in Section 63G-4-101 et seq. of the 
Utah Code, and Rule 151-4 of the Uta.b Administrative Code. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the £ day of'-j ~ I., , 2015 the undersigned served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMEND.~ OFF ACT1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER by mailing a copy through first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
JACK PHILLIPS 
C/O ~ PUGSLEY, JvfARlA E HECKEL 
36 S ST ATE ST STE 1400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and caused a copy to be hand delivered to: 
Thomas Melton, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General of Utah 
Fifth Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Keith Woodwell, Utah Division of Securities 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Second F1oor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Francine A. Giani, Executive Director 
c/o Masuda Medcalf, Adm.i.rus1rative Law Judge 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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ADDENDUM ''F'' 
'~'> 
-
; ~, 
'iffill 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I ' .. ·'. \ ' ... '• \ \ .. \,• .. ,, ~ 
' ' .. .., 
',,, '· .... ~ 
· .., · .. 
fN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
SECOND FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
and 
Jack Phillips, ORDER ON REVIEW 
PETITIONER Case No. SD-12-0001 
_ __._ ______ . _________ _ 
INTRODUCTION 
Jack Phillips ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce (''Department") following the 
Amt;ndcd Findings of Fact1 Conclusions of Law and Order (''Amended Order") issued by 
the Utah Securities Commission (''Commission") on February 4, 2015. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Commission's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code 
Annolrtted, Section 630-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, R 151-4-901 et seq. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
Whelht.:r Petitioner has failed to establish any error in the Commission's 
Ameuded Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Petitioner is a resident of Oregon who has never been licensed to sell 
securities in Utah. 
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2. On May 23, 2014, the Commission's Findings of Fact: Conclusions of 
Law anJ Order (''Order,.) were entered. The Order pennanently barred Petitioner from 
associating wit1-'. any broker-dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah, acting as an 
agent for any issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and being licensed in any 
capacily in the securities industry in Utah. The Commission also assessed a civil penaJty 
uf $413,750.00 ($315,000.00 of which was for investor losses; $78,750.00 as a fine for 
violations of the Securities Act; and $25,000.00 for investigative costs). The 
Commission concluded lhat Petitioner sold securities without a license in violation of the 
Utah Uniform s~curities Act by selling a multi-level marketing oppot1unity and also 
selling an investmenl opportunity i11vr,lving the purchase of emeralds. The Commission 
held that Petitioner further violated the Securities Act in providing false material 
information or omitting niaterial information about the securities to investors. 
1. Petitioner filed a ren.uest for agency review on June 91 2014. On January 
9, 2015, the executive Director issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Review ("Order on Review!') affirming the Commission's Order. The 
Executive Director's Order on Review adopted the Commission's Findings of Fact as 
conch~sive and held that the Commission had not erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law. Order on Review, pp. 4-14. The Executive Director also upheld the fines assessed 
hy the: Commi!ision, concluding thul the fines were within the scope of the Commission's 
Siatutory authority; that they were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of 
Petitioner's conduct and violation of law, and thus, did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment; arni that Petitioner had not established that the fine amount was clearly 
unrcasonabl<:. Id. pp. 15-19. 
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4. The Order on Review rejected Petitioner's argument that the Division had 
the burden of proof as to losses suffered by the investors, Mr. and Mrs. Persch, and that 
the Division has a duty to establish the value of the emeralds now in the possession of the 
Pcrsches for a potential a ffse1 or reduction in the fine assessed against Petitioner. The 
Or<ler on Review stated: 
~21. Pursuant to Utah Ad min. Code R 151-4-709(1 ), the Division has the 
burden of proof to establish a violation of the Securities Act pursuant to its 
Order to Show Cause. The Division rnet that burden. Nothing in the 
applicable laws or rules requires the Division to prove any offset for the 
fines properly assessed by the Commission pursuant to statute. The 
Division and the Commission are not assessing actual damages like in a 
civil case and need not engage in the analysis of actual value of the stones. 
Given that the Division met the burden of proof to establish Petitioner's 
violations of the Securities Act, it was not unreasonable for the 
Com.mission to require Petitioner to establish the value of the stones. Had 
Petitioner presented evidence oft he actual value of the stones, the 
Commission would have offset the fines assessed. The Commission Order 
stated that while a potential offset could be appropriate Petitioner has the 
burden to establish the value of those stones, 
Commission Order, at 13. 
5. I-"inally, in discussing Petitioner's claims that the Commission failed to 
consider the factors in Utah Adm in. Code Section R l 64-31-1 in determining the amount 
of the fine, the Order on Review stated as follows: 
ii26 ... Subsection R 164-3 l -1 (I) sets forth numerous facto rs that the 
Commission "shall" consider in "determining the amount of an 
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform 
Secu!'it:es Act." A review of the Commission Order indicates that the 
Commission acknowledges its authority to consider investor losses, which 
is authority given in Subsection R 164-3 I -1 ( I )(b ), 1 but the Order does not 
reference the rule, nor does the Order address or discuss the other factors 
in Sub:,ection Rl64-31-l(I). An agency's findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual is.sue was raised. Adams v. Bourd 
of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ). Utahns 
for Bt:!fter Dental Health-Davis. Inc. v. Davis County Comm 'n, 2005 UT 
1 There appear to b<· a few t}pographical error:,: in the Order on Review wilh respect to the Division rule; 
lhc concc1 cit~iio:: is Subsection Rl64-3l-l(~)(I). 
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App. 317,117, 121 P.3d 39. Where a Division order fails to reveal a 
logical analysis of the applicable law and the facts, the appropriate remedy 
is a remand to the Division for further proceedings. LaSal Oil Co. v. 
Department of Envtl. Quality, 843 P.2d I 045, l 049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Admns, at 8. 
iJ27. Because the Commission Order does not include a discussion and 
analysis ofthe factors in Subsection RJ64-31-l(l) that it found relevant in 
assessing the total fine against Petitioner, this matter is remanded lo the 
Commission solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the 
C0mmission's thc,ught process and analysis with respect to Subsection 
Rl64-3 l-l(l) factors. 
Order on Review. pp. 19-20. 
6. The Order on Review notified Petitioner of his right to file a petition for 
judicic1! review with the Court of Appeals within 30 days of the Order on Review. 
Petitioner did .f10l file a petition for judicial review lo challenge the Executive Director,s 
decision which affinned the Commission's Order (including lhe amount of the fines 
a~sesscd and the holding that the Division did not have a duty to prove the value of the 
emeralds for any offset of the fines assessed) and remanded the matter only for a 
di~cussion of the Commission's analvsis of the factors in Subsection Rl 64-31-1 (B)( I). 
7. On Febru~ry 4, 2015, the Commission issued its Amended Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Amended Order,,). 17,e Amended Order amended 
par~graphs 18 =1nd 19 in the Conclusions of Law section of the original Order. The 
changes are 1·r~~ked below: 
~ 18. In assessing a fine, the Commission is tnf-t-hori7.ed ~e eoR5icler-tl:l-e-ameutl1-€>~ 
i-A-vestar losses. In th.is ease,the Commission cak-tt-lat~-H·h~sehes ane 
~ngcrs h&w'e-l-est-a-t-eta-1-ef &;J 15,000. J~enelefl-t:-argties--H~t-t:l=te-e1t1crnlels 
ctirrenlly i•fl-t:fle-(lGSS65s+eA-e-f-t:t1e Persehes have-s0-1:ne--value ane:l thal, thef:efere.; 
l:l-A-J'--f~-is subj eel to an o ffsehcbarged under Utah Adrninistrnlive Code § R 164-
.ll:-Kb )(l) to consider the following factors: 
a. the. seriousness, natui:e, circwnstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct 
constituting th~ violation:. 
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b. the hanr1 to other persons. including the amount of investor losses. resulting 
either directly or ~ncl.irectly from the violation; 
c. any financial bcnefil, enrichment, commission. fee or other consideration 
received directly or indirectly by the person in c~)nnect-ion witJ1 the violntion; 
d. cooperation by the person in any inguhy conducted by the Division 
con_cern.ing lhe violation, cfforls to prevent future occurrences or the 
violation. and efforls lo mitigate the harm caused hy the violation, including 
any reslitution paid or disgorg:emenl of ill-gotten gains lo persons injltred by 
tht; acts of the person~ 
e. the historv of previous violations bv the person: 
f. the need tu <lr:ter the person or other persons from committing such 
vio~ations in the future 
g. the costs incurred bv the Division in investigating and prosecuting the 
action: and 
h. st:ch other matt~rn as justice may require. 
In th~s case, Respondent developed very personal, trusting relationships with the 
Persches and Reutlingers over time. On the basis of these relationships of trust 
and (,ui-didence, and through repeated and persistent soli.9llation. Respondent 
convinced the Persches and Reutlingers that he was f~V.Q!.'ing them with an 
exclusive! opportunity not otherwise avai.labJe. This predatory behavior in taking 
advcmlag~ of persons with whom he had a close. personal relationship constitutes 
affin\ty fraud by Respondent, which is a partjcularly serious and repellent form of 
deceit and must be severelv sanctioned in order for the sanction Lo act as a 
deterrent. In addition, Respond-.!nt has not cooperated with the Division. either to 
locate James or in any other manner. In these circumstances, the total investor 
losses of $315,000 directly cc.1used by Respon<.lent's actions are appropriately 
included in the LotaJ fine amount. as are the Division's claimed investigative costs 
Qf $25,000. In ac~twdancc with precedent, tJ,e Commission also finds it 
.illfilLO..ru:iate to assess. as u penalty for violations of the chapter, a fine cnlculated at 
25% of the tota; investor losscs.'1 
-- ·--·-------
4_.Jhere is no evidence in the record that Rcsgg_n._Q!,;ULrg,g_~·jy_~~J.~.1Jv mcaningfu) finnncinl uenetil. enrichment, 
<.:J~mm~.;~ion, fee or 0U1er con.fil~cnnion_[ronUh.Q transactions involvi1\g the Persches and the Reullingers. 
~or is llwre evidence th;il R.9~9.ncJ~!tUH!.HLbJt;_to1y or previous violations. Ir such evidence were available, 
lhe circnmstunces might con.i;til\ttc nddiliona) aggrav.ating factors juslifying an a:dditional penally. Without 
soch evidence, ih~ Commission finds ii nppropriate 10 assess Respondent's line according to C!itaulished 
precedi;;111 for a firsl offense where Lhe resp_onden.L!:.1:..~~lY..e.Q..!itt~J.9 . .PQ financial benefit from the 
transactions at issue. 
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if l 9. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of the Persches 
have some unspecified value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. 
While an offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the 
Commission has the burden to investigate and calculate [-i-t]a potential offset, if 
any. The investors did not enter into the emerald deal in order to obtain 
emeralds. Their 0bjective was to realize a financial profit from an investment. If 
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than 
through a fimn~,:ial [~]return, [Re]Rcspondenl has the burden to prove his 
position~ including the value of the emeralds to a reasonable certainty, with 
competent and admissible evidence. Here, Respondent has speculated to that 
end, but has failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to 
estab!ish any factual basis for offsetting the fine requested by the Division. 
Respondent merely speculates about potential value, bul does not prove lhe 
value, i r any, of the alleged emeralds. 
Atnencied Ord~r, pp. 
8. On March 6, 2014, Petitioner filed a request for agency review of the 
Amended Order. The partles have submitted their respective memoranda. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce 
c.01TesiJnnd t.o those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
A.I-notated Section 630-4-403(4). Utah Admin. Code R 151-4-905. The Executive 
Director appl~e!) the correction-of-error standard when reviewing the Commission ,s 
inlerprt!tation of general questions of law, granting no deference to the Commission,s 
decisions. Assnciated Gen. Contr. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 200 l UT 112, ~18, 38 
P.Jd 29 l. Therefore! whelher the Commission correct1y applied the instructions given in 
thi! Order on Review is reviewed for correctness. 
2. Petitioner asks that the Amended Order be reversed. He argues that the 
Commission 'Nrongfully assessed the $413 1750.00 fine against him without providing the 
neccss,tr~· analysis of the f-.;~tors supporting the fine under Subsection R 164-31-1 (B)(I ), 
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and it is only 1:ow with the Commission•s "post hoc rationalizations'' and analysis in the 
Amended Order that the Executive Director can make an accurate detennination 
regarding the reasonableness of the fine. Petitioner,s Motion and Memorandum in 
Suµporl of Agency Review ("Memorandum in Support'} pp. 2-3. Petitioner relies on 
case law including State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 982 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) for the 
proposition that a remand for detailed findings of fact is not intended to be a mere 
"bolstering" of the trial court's previous decision. Memorandum in Support, pp. 3-4. 
Petitioner incorporates by ·reference the arguments made in his prior request for agency 
review tiled on June 9, 2014. Id. 
J. The Executive Director has already ruled on all the issues raised by 
Prtitioner in the Order on Review issued on January 9, 2015. The Executive Director 
eY.plic~Lly stated that the remand was for the very narrow purpose of articulating the 
Commission's thought process under Subsection Rl64-3l-1(B)(l). If Petitioner believed 
that the Executive Director's ruling was improper under any legal theory: his remedy was 
to reqLtest reconsideration or seek judicial review. 13y remaining silent while the 
Commission acted on the Executive Director's specific instructions, Petitioner waived 
any ohJection he might have made as to those instructions. 
~. Petitioner argues thal the Amended Order improperly shifted the burden of 
proof to Petirioner regarding any potential offset of the fines assessed. Id, p. 3. This 
issue was fully addressed in the Order on Review, and the matter was remanded to the 
Commission solely for a written discussion of the Subsection R 164-31-1 (8)(1) factors 
consiciered by the Commission. The Amended Order revised ti 8 in the Conclusions of 
Law hy reorganizing the discussion of the value of the emeralds and any offset as to fines 
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assessed to J n~wly numbered 119 and adding the Commission's discussion of 
Suhsr.ction R 164-31- 1 (B)( 1) factors to~ 18. The newly numbered ~ 19 has minor changes 
from the original Commission Order when discussing the value of the emeralds and an 
offset of the fine amount. As the Order on Review remanded the matter for the limited 
purpose of a diicussion of Subsection R 164-31- l (B)( 1) factors, any alterations from the 
original Commission Order as to the value of the emeralds and an offset of the assessed 
fines: beyond organizing the discussion into the new 119, are hereby stricken. The 
Commission shall therefore issue a corrected Amended Order as indicated herein. 
s. The Order on Review concluded that the fines assessed by the 
Commission were within the scope of the Commission\s statutory authority! that they 
Wde not grossly dispropot1ionale lo the gravity of the offense so as lo violate the Eighth 
Amend;nent, and that Pe:titioner had not proven that the total fine amount was clearly 
un1\?a:-;onabic in light 0f the Commission, s statutory grant of discretion. Order on 
Rc,.1iew. pp. l .~ • i 9. The record was clear that the Commission considered Subsection 
R l 64--31-1 (D)("I) in setting the amount of the fine. The parties brought the factors to the 
Commission•s attention on several occasions at the hearing. 3 The Commission Order 
stated that the Commission was authorized to consider investor losses,4 a factor provided 
for in Subsection Rl64-31-l(B)(1). ln addition, in other parts of the Commission Order, 
other Subsection Rl 64-31-1 (B)(l) factors such as the nature, circumstances and 
scriousnes~ of the violations were mer,1ioned as were the costs of the investigation. 5 
----·- -------
.) For e.<ampk, in G:osings 11rgt1ments, counse-1 for both parties fully discussed the factors in Section Rl64-
3 l-l (B)l '). 1 rJnscript, 424:24-25 1 425.1- i :i; 448: 13-25; 449: 1-6. 
4 Commiss,on Ordc<1118. 
~ Co1~111fr,sion (;1der, pp. 2-IJ. 
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6. The Executive Director has reviewed numerous cases frorn the 
Commission and the Division; she has knowledge of the Commission's statutory 
authority and is aware of the precedent with respect to establishing fines for violations of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The Executive Director was therefore able to conduct a 
meaningful review in light or the Commission's stated findings, its implied tindings,6 and 
the Executive Director's own knowledge. See Utah Code Ann. §630-4-206(1 )(b)(iv) 
(providing that a presiding officer may take official notice or any facts within the 
ag(:ncy's speciI1lized knowledge). However, where the Utah Court of Appeals would not 
ha,1e the same knowledge of the agency's precedent, the Executive Director required the 
<r:ommission to state rather than imply its analysis of the rule factors in order to facilitate 
judicial review. 
7. The Executive Director does not consider the Amended Order, with its 
discu~sion o[ the factors in Subsection R 164-31-1 to be impennissible bolstering, but 
simplv an articulation of the Commission's decision. Therefore, the Amended Order is 
hereby affirmed with the modification indicated herein, removal of any changes from the 
original Commission Order in the newly numbered Conclusion of Law ~II 9 regarding the 
value of the emeralds. 
8. :\.s a final matter, in r.onducting this second agency review, the Executive 
Oirt:ctor nott::; an error in Conclusion of Law paragraph 16, p. 13 of the original Order on 
Review. The.: second to the last sentence of that paragraph does not make malhemalical 
6 See Ut11h Code Ann. § 63 G-4-4 OJ( 4)(g) (prnvid ing tha! relief may be granted only if a petitioner has been 
p1·ejudiced by agency action based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency.) See at.so, 
Adcm,s ,,. Board of Revh1w of !ndul'lrial Comm ·n. 821 P.2d I, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that 
finding., may be implied). 
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sense: 
Finally, even if it were held that the Commission,s authority to issue fines 
for violations of the Securities Act is limited to $10:000.00 per violation, 
the Commission,s Order with its fine of $78,750.00 for four violations of 
lhe Act would meet such a limit. 
Order on Review, p. 13. This error needs to be noted should this matter be appealed. 
Howt!ver, where the quoted language is dicta, it does not affect or change the conclusion 
rt!ached by the Executive Director in the first part of paragraph 16 that based on a 
statutory interpretation, the $10,000.00 limit in Utah Code. Ann. §61-1-20(2) for ci vi I 
actions does not apply to this administrative action by the Commission. 
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ORDER ON REVIEW 
ThC", Commission':i Amended Order is affirmed with the modification that the text 
of !he new~ 19 in the Conclusions of Law section revert to the exact language used in the 
origin~.l Commission Order when discussing the value of the emeralds. 
NOTICE OF RIG HT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition 
for Rl:\•iew mcst comply with the requirements of Sections 63G-4-40 l and 63G-4-403, 
Utah Code ·\nnotated. ln the a1lernative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administru~ive remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bnurgeous v. 
1Jepartme1·:/ of Commerce, el al., 981 P .2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
dat:.! of this Order pursuant to Sed1on 630-4-302. 
~ 
Datc-:i this 5 - of June, 2015. 
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Francine A. Giani, Ex cutiv;~ 
Utah Department of Commerce 
.. 
11 
CERTlFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the(bt\t\ day of June, 2015, the undersigned mailed a true and 
c.c,rrect copy of the foregoing Second Findings of Fact: Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
Review by first class and certified mail to: 
MARK W 1">UGSLEY ESQ 
MARIA E HECKEL 
1~\ Y QUfPlNEY & NEBEKER PC 
36 SOUTH ST ATE STREET 14111 FL 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0385 
and co.used~: .::,py to be electronically mailed to: 
Keith Woodwell, Director (kwoodwell@utah.gov) 
Division of Se~urities 
l 60 E~st 3 00 South 
Salt L~ke City, UT 84111 
Tom Melton, Assistant Attorney General (1melton@utah.gov) 
Office of the Attorney General 
B0x 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
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